Economic Themes from the National People's Congress Illustrate CCP Concerns for Social Stability
John Dotson
This month, the National People's Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui, 全国人民代表大会), or NPC, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, 中国人民政治协商会议) convened concurrently in Beijing. Collectively known as the "Two Sessions" (Lianghui, 两会), the annual meetings of these bodies—normally held for two weeks in the early spring—comprise two of the largest annual events on China's official political calendar. The two bodies hold no real power—and function as, respectively, a rubber stamp legislature for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy decisions, and as a nominal advisory body intended to provide the state with a veneer of political pluralism. However, while the NPC and the CPPCC are both highly scripted, the "Two Sessions" often provide insights into the concerns and policy priorities of the CCP's senior leadership.
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"Stability Maintenance" Gets a Major Boost at the National People's Congress
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Since the mid-2010s, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been preoccupied with ensuring a relatively high growth rate for China, even as the economy is facing serious downward pressures. This has emerged as a perennial theme in the annual springtime meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and its counterpart, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). However, an even more striking theme this year is "stability maintenance" (weiwen, 维稳)—coded language for ensuring the CCP's "perennial ruling status," and President's Xi Jinping's quasi-permanent role as the "leadership core" of the world's largest political organization.
In his annual Government Work Report to the NPC, Premier Li Keqiang gave utmost emphasis to upholding social stability through means such as job creation and raising welfare payouts to underprivileged classes (China Brief, March 22). Saving and creating jobs was first among the six major areas of stability cited by Li: "stabilizing employment; stabilizing finance; stabilizing foreign trade; stabilizing foreign investment; stabilizing [domestic] investment; and stabilizing expectations." The Li cabinet has committed itself to creating 11 million new urban jobs through 2019—a tall order given the large number of factories along the coast that are moving to other countries, either to save costs or to avoid being hit by U.S. tariffs (China Daily, March 6).
China's New Foreign Investment Law: Quick Passage after a Long Wait
April A. Herlevi
On March 15th, the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) formally passed a new Foreign Investment Law (waishang touzi fa, 外商投资法) to govern the increasingly complex issues surrounding foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. According to the state news service Xinhua, under the new FDI law "A foreign company doing business in China will enjoy a better investment environment" (Xinhua Twitter feed, March 2). Xinhua also claims that "the law will create a more stable, more transparent and predictable legal environment for foreign businesses in China" (Xinhua, March 2). The new FDI law will officially come into force on January 1, 2020 (Xinhua, March 19).
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China's Policy Towards a Venezuela in Crisis
Jared Ward
Amid the ongoing crisis in Venezuela—in which the country faces not only economic meltdown, but also a division between two rival presidents, in the persons of incumbent President Nicolas Maduro and opposition leader Juan Guaido—the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains one of the most prominent and influential nations continuing to recognize the legitimacy of the embattled Maduro government. The PRC has refused to offer any support to the opposition, and has maintained its friendly relations with the sitting government; however, Venezuela's increasing international isolation and free-falling economy carry with them increasing anxieties that Maduro can remain a useful partner. The erosion of Venezuela's economic situation—including its ability to continue oil production—has left China scrambling for ways to respond to the worsening situation of its ally in Caracas.
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Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy
Conor Kennedy
On August 1, 2017, China opened its first overseas military base, in the East African nation of Djibouti. This was a landmark event that raised a whole host of questions for Indo-Pacific states: Is Djibouti the first of other bases to come? If so, how many? Where will China build them? How will they be used? Where do they fit into Chinese military strategy? Chinese policymakers and analysts are pondering these same questions. However, they are employing concepts unique to Chinese strategic discourse, and it is essential to grasp these concepts in order to understand how Beijing intends to project military power abroad.
For the People's Republic of China (PRC), the term "overseas military base" (haiwai junshi jidi, 海外军事基地) carries significant historical baggage: foreign imperialists built them on the soil of other countries in order to colonize and exploit them. On the other hand, Chinese policymakers have come to recognize the value of maintaining locations overseas where the Chinese military—above all, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—can concentrate resources needed to support operations abroad. To distinguish Chinese actions from the predatory deeds of Western and Japanese imperialists, Chinese military thinkers have adopted a specialized term: the "strategic strong point" (zhanlüe zhidian, 战略支点). [1] A careful analysis of the Chinese use of this concept offers valuable insights into Beijing's strategic intentions outside of East Asia.
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