| Decision Summaries Click on any decision below to get the full opinion from the New Jersey Judiciary - November 19, 2019
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION There were no opinions approved for publication. NOT APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-2-3052 In the Matter of E.P., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (12 pp.) Appellant requested an administrative hearing before respondent, the Department of Human Services. Appellant, a developmentally disabled adult, was a client of respondent. Appellant was initially authorized for twenty-two hours per week of Personal Care Assistance. In March 2017, respondent had a registered nurse conduct a reassessment of appellant's home needs. As a result of that reassessment, respondent reduced appellant's PCA to eight hours per week. Appellant's guardian called respondent regarding appealing within the time period for an appeal. Respondent stated the phone call was sufficient notice of an appeal but suggested following up in writing. The writing was sent two days after the appeal period ended. For months appellant's guardian continued to request a hearing, but respondent only stated the matter was under review or they did not have a record of the appeal, and she should call back in two weeks. Appellant's guardian involved a state legislator and eventually hired an attorney who sent multiple letters before respondent issued a decision in November 2018, stating the attorney's October 2018 letter was respondent's first record of appellant's request for an appeal hearing. Respondent therefore denied the request despite appellant sending multiple previous writings requesting a hearing. On appeal of respondent's denial, the court reversed and remanded, finding respondent's decision clearly arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The court noted respondent suffered no prejudice due to any delay. CIVIL RIGHTS 46-2-3053 Martinez v. S. Woods State Prison, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (7 pp.) Plaintiff appealed a partial grant of summary judgment and the directed verdict in his New Jersey Civil Rights Act action asserting defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical care and were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition. Incarcerated plaintiff reported pain and vomiting to prison medical staff. He was eventually diagnosed with pancreatitis and required surgery. He contended that if his condition had been taken seriously when he first reported it, surgery could have been avoided. Defendants argued they were immune from suit and respondeat superior could not be used in a §1983 action. Trial court dismissed the vicarious liability and respondeat superior count and then granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict at trial. Court agreed with trial court that the New Jersey legislature chose not to include an express waiver of sovereign immunity in the NJCRA. Similarly, New Jersey had immunity under §1983. Accordingly, defendants were immune from suit under the NJCRA. Additionally, while the NJCRA did not define "person," N.J. S.A. 1:1-2 provided a definition of "person" that included the State of New Jersey only in the event of a property dispute, which was not the case here. Section 1983 did not create a cause of action against a state, because a state was not a person, and the same conclusion was mandated regarding the NJCRA. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17-2-3054 R&K Assoc., LLC v. Dep't of Envt'l Prot., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (15 pp.) Des Champs Laboratories, Inc. appealed from the DEP's final agency decision denying Des Champs a de minimis quantity exemption under the Industrial Site Recovery Act. Des Champs certified that there had been no discharge of hazardous substances from the property. Accordingly, the DEP issued a no further action letter authorizing Des Champs to cease operations at the site. Plaintiff later bought the property from Des Champs. DEP began to investigate groundwater contamination in Livingston, which was traced to the Des Champs site. DEP therefore rescinded its no further action letter and directed Des Champs to prepare a site investigation report. Thereafter, Des Champs applied for a DQE, seeking an exemption from the strict liability remediation requirements of IRSA. DEP denied the application because Des Champs failed to certify that the property was free of contamination. Although the DQE was originally granted on appeal, the court reversed the grant on plaintiff's appeal. Thereafter, DEP submitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. An ALJ recommended denial of the DQE, ruling that a former owner like Des Champs could not obtain a DQE; the ALJ noted that, but for this rule, she would have recommended issuance of the DQE because plaintiff had not met its burden of proof. The court reversed, ruling that a former owner could obtain a DQE but that the burden of proof rested on Des Champs. However, the ALJ reconsidered and concluded that the evidence did not support granting Des Champs a DQE. Des Champs then filed the present appeal. On appeal, the court affirmed, finding no basis to overturn the ALJ's or DEP's agency decision or administrative expertise. The court noted that Des Champs' failure to meet its burden of proof fell at its feet, further noting the ALJ's determination that Des Champs had engaged in selective disclosure of information. FAMILY LAW 20-2-3055 D.A.W. v. W.G.W., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (9 pp.) Defendant appealed post-judgment orders in a matrimonial action that required him to remove personal property from the former marital residence. The parties married in 1982, divorced in 2017 and plaintiff continued to reside in the former marital residence. PSA provided that defendant would retain ownership and possession of six vehicles and remove them from the marital residence within 30 days of the execution of the agreement and would inventory and remove other personal property. Defendant failed to do so. Plaintiff moved to enforce litigant's rights. Trial court ordered defendant to perform the inventory and remove his personal property. Defendant failed to comply, and trial court ordered that plaintiff could dispose of the property. Defendant moved for reconsideration relying on an uncertified physician's letter that he should stay off his feet. Court found defendant had the ability to comply, failed to do so and ordered him to turn over the titles to the six vehicles. He did not comply, and trial court appointed plaintiff as attorney-in-fact so she could obtain duplicate titles. Defendant argued trial court abused its discretion by ordering the forfeiture of his property as a sanction for not timely removing it. Court found no abuse of discretion by trial court and its findings and conclusions were fully supported by the record. LANDLORD/TENANT 27-2-3056 Summerton Group, LLC v. Nessalee Prod., LLC, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (8 pp.) Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its claims relating to personal guarantees on a commercial lease. The parties entered into a commercial lease. Lease named LLC as the commercial tenant and individual defendants signed their names to the lease and the "rider to lease agreement" as tenants. Defendant Epstein also signed a document stating that he, as tenant and owner of company, agreed to indemnify and hold harmless plaintiff for "any and all liabilities." Issues arose over lease payments and plaintiff filed an eviction action asserting breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and unjust enrichment against LLC and the two individuals as guarantors under the lease. Individual defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them for failure to state a claim. Defendant Antonelli certified she was the sole member of the LLC and provided a copy of the marked-up lease with the personal guarantees deleted from the agreement. Plaintiff's representative referenced emails between the parties conditioning the lease on a personal guarantee but conceded the lease contained no guarantee. Plaintiff argued motion judge erred because he considered documentation and representations which went beyond the pleadings. Court found motion judge did not reference facts outside the complaint, the hold harmless agreement was not a promise to be responsible for rent payments and the lease contained no guarantee language. |
